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Abstract
If ¯rms borrow working capital to ¯nance production, then nominal interest
rates have a direct in°uence on in°ation dynamics, which appears to be the case
empirically. However, interest rates may only partly mirror the cost of working
capital. In this paper we explore the role of bank lending standards as a potential
additional cost source and evaluate their empirical importance in explaining in°ation
dynamics in the US and in the euro area.
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11 Introduction
If ¯rms have to borrow working capital to ¯nance production, the nominal interest rate
represents a cost factor and therefore in°uences price-setting behavior. These e®ects have
been labeled the cost channel transmission of monetary policy. Several studies ¯nd that a
cost channel has implications for monetary policy: Ravenna and Walsh (2006) argue that
a cost channel limits the scope for monetary stabilization policy. Tillmann (2009a) shows
that uncertainty about the strength of the cost channel in°uences the optimal setting of
interest rates by the central bank and Tillmann (2009b) ¯nds that a cost channel dampens
the impact of model uncertainty on monetary policy.
Empirical evidence indicates that the cost channel adds substantially to the explana-
tion of in°ation dynamics (Tillmann 2008). Moreover, the direct e®ect of interest rate
changes on in°ation is typically found to be relatively strong, which is somewhat surpris-
ing for a number of reasons: Firms may not have to borrow the entire costs of production
in advance Ravenna and Walsh (2006), or alternatively only a part of the ¯rms in the
economy may be subject to a cost channel. In either case, the response of the in°ation
rate should be smaller than the change in the interest rate. In addition, the interest rates
relevant for working capital may not respond fully to changes in money market rates.
Especially retail interest rates are typically rigid. Hence, banks may shelter ¯rms from
large changes in the cost of working capital (Chowdhury et al. 2006; HÄ ulsewig et al. 2006;
Kaufmann and Scharler 2009).
These considerations have been reconciled with the empirical evidence by arguing
that interest rates do not represent the entire cost of working capital. Chowdhury et al.
(2006) argue that broadly de¯ned ¯nancial frictions result in additional costs, which are
not directly mirrored in interest payment. The purpose of this paper is to explicitly allow
for indirect cost channel e®ects in addition to those directly related to nominal interest
rates.
Our analysis is based on the New Keynesian Phillips Curve augmented by the short-
term interest rate and bank lending standards as proxy for indirect costs associated with
working capital. We assess the role of standards for in°ation dynamics using a vector
autoregression which we estimate within a Bayesian framework. As the e®ects of lending
standards may depend on the ¯nancial system, we estimate systems for the US, as an
2example for a market-based system, and the euro area which is characterized by a bank-
based ¯nancial system. Since only relatively short series are available for the euro area,
the Bayesian method has some advantages. In particular, we are able to evaluate whether
di®erences between US and euro area estimates are due to a lack of data for the euro area
or indicate di®erences in the transmission mechanism between both regions. Lending
standards for the euro area are only available since 2003 which does not allow us to
obtain precise estimates. However, we will use the posterior inference about US data to
design prior information for the euro area system.
We ¯nd that lending standards counteract the interest rate e®ect on price-setting in
the US. That is, a tightening of monetary policy, for instance, is accompanied by looser
lending standards, which dampens the higher cost of working capital. For the euro area we
¯nd only limited evidence that lending standards matter for in°ation dynamics. When
we exclude lending standards from the system, we obtain a larger impact of interest
rate shocks on in°ation. This result suggests that if indirect cost e®ects associated with
bank lending standards are not explicitly accounted for, then the direct in°uence of the
interest rate on price setting appears to be larger. A posterior predictive test on data
correlations con¯rms a well-speci¯ed system for the US. Test results for the euro area
show that using US posterior information to design the euro area system's prior helps in
capturing correlations between the interest rate and standards, and partially between the
interest rate and unit labor costs. This suggests that the relation between interest rates
and lending standards are similar across both regions. On the other hand, US posterior
as prior information does not a®ect the correlation between in°ation and standards, it
deteriorates the correlation between in°ation and the interest rate. This suggests that,
as longer time series will be available, the transmission mechanism may turn out to be
di®erent between the regions.
Only few paper analyze empirically the role of bank lending standards. The implica-
tions of bank lending standards for the business cycle in the US are explored in Lown and
Morgan (2006). Using the con¯dential euro area country-speci¯c responses to the Bank
Lending Survey of the European Central Bank, Maddaloni and Peydrµ o (2009) study,
among other issues, the impact of the overnight interest rate level on lending standards.
Our analysis di®ers from these two papers in the sense that we focus on in°ation dynamics
3and the transmission of policy shocks to in°ation via lending standards.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we derive the aug-
mented New Keynesian Phillips Curve which is the basis for our analysis. Section 3
discusses our empirical methodology while Section 4 describes our data set. In Section 5
we represent our estimation results. The importance of lending standards for the trans-
mission mechanism is assessed in Section 6 and in Section 7 we evaluate the usefulness
of using the posterior inference about the US to design the prior speci¯cation of the euro
area's system. Section 8 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical Motivation
Our analysis is based on the New Keynesian Phillips curve augmented by bank lending
standards as a factor in°uencing marginal production cost. To derive the New Keynesian
Phillips curve, we closely follow Gal¶ ³ et al. (1999) and Gal¶ ³ et al. (2001). Hence, the
discussion will be brief. We assume that the business sector of the economy consists of
a continuum of monopolistically competitive ¯rms normalized to have unit mass. Each
¯rm i hires labor, hit, and produces a di®erentiated good according to: yit = h
1¡®
it . Each
¯rm sells its output at a price pit and faces the demand curve yd
it = (pit=pt)¡²yt, where pt
and yt denote the aggregate price level and aggregate output. As in Calvo (1983), each
period, a fraction (1 ¡ µ) of the ¯rms is able to adjust its price.
To introduce a cost channel, we follow Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and Chowdhury
et al. (2006) and assume that ¯rms have to ¯nance the wage bill in advance of production.
Hence, ¯rms have to borrow an amount equal to the wage bill, wtht, where wt is the
nominal wage. We assume that the total cost associated with ¯nancing of working capital
is ·tRl
t, where Rl
t is the interest rate and ·t captures non-interest borrowing costs. Thus,
total expenditure is ·tRl
twtht.
For ·t = 1, borrowing costs consist entirely of interest payments. If ·t > 1 ¯rms incur
additional borrowing costs beyond the interest rate. If for instance, banks tighten their
lending standards during times of rising interest rates, ¯rms may incur additional costs as
they may have to provide more collateral. Chowdhury et al. (2006) argue that ¯nancial
frictions in a broad sense may amplify the cost e®ects of interest rates to rationalize large
cost channel e®ects.










where mcit denotes marginal cost. Note that (1) implies that d mct = ^ ·t+ ^ Rl
t+^ st, where st =
(wtht)=(ptyt) denotes unit labor costs, and hatted variables denote percentage deviations
from the steady state.
As in Gal¶ ³ et al. (1999) and Gal¶ ³ et al. (2001) we allow for in°ation persistence by
introducing ¯rms that follow a backward looking pricing rule. Only a fraction (1 ¡ !) of
the ¯rms which can set prices in the current period, resets prices optimally. The remaining
¯rms follow a backward looking rule.
Combining these assumptions gives rise to the New Keynesian Phillips Curve:
^ ¼t = ¸d mct + °fEt^ ¼t+1 + °b^ ¼t¡1; (2)
where ¸ =
(1¡µ)(1¡µ¯)(1¡®)(1¡!)
(1+®(²¡1)) Á¡1, °f = ¯µÁ¡1, °b = !Á¡1, Á = µ + !(1 ¡ µ(1 ¡ ¯)), ¯
is the discount factor, and ¼t denotes the in°ation rate. The dynamics of marginal costs,
d mct, are determined by the borrowing rate, non-interest borrowing costs and wage costs,
see equation (1) above.
Moreover, we allow that the interest rate at which ¯rms borrow working capital, Rl
t,
tracks the money market interest rate, Rt, only imperfectly. More speci¯cally, we assume
that ^ Rl
t = Ã ^ Rt, as it is common in the literature on the cost channel (Chowdhury et al.
2006; HÄ ulsewig et al. 2006). Thus, we obtain
^ ¼t = ¸^ ·t + ¸Ã ^ Rt + ¸^ st + °fEt^ ¼t+1 + °b^ ¼t¡1: (3)
Hence, in addition to direct interest rate e®ects, ¯rms may be subject to additional
non-interest borrowing costs. If ·t is constant over time, we obtain the formulation
in Chowdhury et al. (2006). If in addition, Ã = 1 then (3) reduces to the interest rate
augmented New Keynesian Phillips Curve derived in Ravenna and Walsh (2006). In our
empirical analysis, we will use bank lending standards, stt, as a proxy for non-interest
borrowing costs. To do so, we assume that ·t = ·0 + ·1stt, and therefore ^ ·t = b stt. Thus,
the dynamics ·t mirror °uctuations in standards.
There are several methods to assess the relevance of direct cost e®ects. One possibility,
followed in Chowdhury et al. (2006), is to estimate equation (3) by general methods
5of moments. The other possibility is to calibrate a model to the countries or regions
under investigation (Kaufmann and Scharler 2009). The second approach would require
quantifying the direct e®ect of non-interest borrowing costs on in°ation, for which so far
reference literature is, to our knowledge, not available. Therefore, we will estimate the
Phillips curve with empirical data to obtain the inference on the importance of non-interest
borrowing costs.
3 Method and empirical strategy
To assess empirically the relevance of the cost channel and of lending standards in par-
ticular, we ¯rst extend equation (3) to allow for general e®ects:
^ ¼t = ¸0^ ·t + ¸1Ã ^ Rt + ¸2^ st + °fEt^ ¼t+1 + °b^ ¼t¡1: (4)
Under rational expectation agents form unbiased expectations. Hence, realized in°a-
























































































































































with the error term "t » N (0;§).
This system can be estimated with standard methods. The Bayesian framework we
adopt here implies some advantages, in particular to assess the signi¯cance of the channel
for the euro area and the di®erences between the US and the euro area. We estimate the
system by Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo methods. For the interested reader, the
sampler is described in Kaufmann and Valderrama (2008).
6The in°uence of unexpected changes in the interest rate, in standards and unit labor
costs on in°ation is assessed by computing structural impulse response functions iden-
ti¯ed by a Cholesky decomposition of the error covariance matrix. This decomposition
is based on the variable ordering given in (6). The interest rate is ordered second-last
as lending standards may well react contemporaneously to interest rate shocks. Interest
rates, re°ecting monetary policy changes, are less expected to react contemporaneously
to a shock in lending standards. A variance decomposition complements the impulse re-
sponse analysis, with which we can assess the relative importance of shocks in the forecast
error variance of the variables.
When interpreting the results, we have to take into account that without any further
assumptions on the interest rate smoothing parameter Ã, see equation (6), the e®ect of
the direct interest rate cost, ¸1, is not identi¯ed. Moreover, the reaction of in°ation to the
third structural shock not only contains the cost-push e®ects of interest rate increases but
also the usual demand e®ect stemming from the interest rate channel. Thus, the impulse
response contains the net e®ect of both channels, conveying evidence about their relative
strength.
To assess the importance of standards as non-interest borrowing costs for ¯rms, the
system is compared to one in which standards are excluded. If standards are important,
we expect that their e®ect will be picked up by the interest rate and the unit labor costs
in the reduced system.
Lending standards for the euro area have been published on a quarterly basis only
since 2003. Of course, this is too few data to obtain a precise estimate. However, we
will use the posterior inference obtained with US data as prior information for the euro
area system. The comparison between this estimate and results obtained with a standard
Minnesota-inverse Wishart prior for the VAR-parameters and the error covariance matrix
yields ¯rst evidence of whether di®erences in the cost channel transmission are observable
between the two regions.
Finally, a posterior predictive test on data correlation complements the analysis and
serves as model diagnostic.
74 The data
The data used to estimate the Phillips curve are taken from the ECB's statistical website
for the euro area and from the Federal Reserve Board's website and from the International
Financial Statistics (IFS) databank for the US (see also Table 1). The beginning of the
estimation sample is given by the start of the lending standards series in both regions. By
the time of the investigation, for the US the observation sample has been running from
the second quarter of 1990 to the third quarter of 2008 and for the euro area the sample
begins in 2003 and runs through the third quarter of 2008. Although the sample for the
euro area is very short, the Bayesian approach pursued in the paper yields ¯rst results to
compare whether dynamics are di®erent between regions. The results of the euro area are
assessed by using the US posterior inference to shape the prior distribution of the VAR-
parameters and the error covariance matrix of the euro area's system. The evaluation
yields ¯rst evidence of whether di®erences between both regions are due to lack of data
for the euro area or due to the di®erent design of ¯nancial systems, i.e. market-based
versus bank-based system.
Lending standards for the US are taken from the Senior Loan O±cer (SLO) Opinion
Survey on Bank Lending Practices, a quarterly survey of major banks around the US.
As in Lown and Morgan (2006), we use the responses of lenders to the question about
lending standards to large ¯rms (Question 1). These report on a quarterly basis show
how their lending standards have changed over the past three months and the indicator
we use is the net percentage of respondents reporting tightening standards in loans.1 In
the euro area, the bank lending survey has been introduced in 2001 (see Berg, van Rixtel,
Ferrando, de Bondt, and Scope 2005, European Central Bank 2003). Since then, major
banks in the euro area have been reporting on the change in their lending standards. To
be consistent with the US series, we use the report about net tightening of loans to large
enterprizes (Question 1).2
1The respondents characterize the changes in lending standards as \tightened considerably", \tight-
ened somewhat", \basically remained unchanged", \eased somewhat" and \eased considerably". The
indicator is compiled as the di®erence between the number of respondents reporting tightened standards
and those reporting eased standards expressed as a percentage of all respondents.
2The categories to report changes in lending standards are the same as in the SLO survey, see footnote
1. To take into account that a country's weight does not correspond to the country's lending share in
the euro area, the responses are weighted by the country's lending share in total euro area lending when
compiling the euro area ¯gures. The net percentage of respondents tightening lending standards is then
8The series are depicted in the upper-left panel of ¯gure 1, in which the bold line
represents the euro area series. The shaded areas refer to NBER dated recession periods.
The correspondence between a high share of lenders tightening standards and recessions
is obvious. There is a high correspondence between the US and the euro area time series,
the correlation coe±cient being 0.83. For the US, the historical high of 59.7, reached
in the ¯rst quarter of 2001, has recently been exceeded by 83.6 in the fourth quarter of
2008. Lately, the net percentage of lenders tightening standards has come down to 64.2
and 39.6 in the ¯rst two quarters of 2009. It is worth noting that the historical low levels
around -20 lasted throughout 2004 until the third quarter of 2005. The percentage of
lenders easing lending standards exceeded the percentage of those tightening standards
even until the third quarter of 2006. Thus, the majority of lenders eased lending standards
consecutively for two and a half years, undoubtedly a consequence of the lasting period of
low interest rate levels, decreasing below 2% from 2002 throughout 2004. In the euro area,
the historical high of 67 in the ¯rst quarter of 2003 has been exceeded by 1 percentage
point in the fourth quarter of 2008. The net percentage tightening standards has come
down to 63 and 48 in the ¯rst two quarters of 2009, euro area banks apparently returning
more sluggishly { or more cautiously { to less tight lending standards.
The correlation between the lending standards indicator and the interest rate is rather
low for the US. Contemporaneously, they nearly are uncorrelated (-0.03), and when the
Federal Funds rate is lagged by 1 quarter, the correlation coe±cient is 0.1. The corre-
sponding correlation between the series for the euro area are positive. The contempora-
neous correlation is 0.16, and when the 1 month EURIBOR rate is lagged by 1 quarter it
increases to 0.55.
The bottom panels in ¯gure 1 show the series for the unit labor costs and for the
in°ation rate. The unit labor costs for the US, which correspond to the unit labor costs
of non-¯nancial corporations, are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The series
for the euro area represents total unit labor costs. Finally, the in°ation rate of the US
is computed on the basis of the consumer price index (CPI), which is retrieved from the
IFS database. The harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) forms the basis for the
euro area in°ation rate.
compiled as the di®erence between the percentage of respondents who tightened minus the percentage of
respondents who eased standards.
9The variables enter in the system (6) in deviation from trends, for which we account in
the following manner. Given that the Federal Reserve Board and the European Central
Bank are devoted to price stability, in°ation is not expected to trend but to °uctuate
around a certain level rate. In°ation thus enters in levels and a constant accounts for
the long-run level rate. The trend in unit labor costs is removed by taking the di®erence
of the logarithmic level, the series enters in growth rates into the system. Interest rates
are di®erenced, given that they usually are borderline non-stationary without a long-
term drift, however. Finally lending standards are included in levels, given that the
series oscillate around 0 and have an upper and lower bound (100 and -100, respectively).
Thus, the variables in equation (6) will have as empirical counterparts the in°ation rate
and lending standards in levels, real unit labor costs in growth rates and the interest rate
in di®erences.
5 Results
We estimate model (6) by Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. We
sample 23,000 times from the posterior distribution, discard the ¯rst 8,000 to remove
dependence on initial conditions, and retain every third draw to remove dependence across
the simulations. The US sample is restricted to end in the third quarter of 2007, given
that a preliminary analysis identi¯ed a regime change in the dynamics of the data in the
fourth quarter of 2007, during which the subprime market crisis became virulent and led
to the still ongoing deep ¯nancial market crisis.3 There are too few observations to obtain
a reliable inference for this period. Therefore, we cap the sample.
According to the cost channel, monetary policy exerts supply side e®ects on the econ-
omy since variations in interest rates in°uence marginal costs of production. The main
purpose of our analysis is to explicitly account for lending standards in this framework.
Thus, what we are primarily interested in, is how lending standards in°uence the trans-
mission of interest rate shocks to the in°ation rate.
Figure 2 shows impulse responses for the US along with the 90th percentile interval.
We see that a contractionary policy shock, that is a positive innovation to the interest
3Although we omit the results, they are available upon request. The estimated posterior probability
of a regime change in the third quarter of 2007 is well above 75% and increases to nearly 100% for the
rest of the observations.
10rate equation, increases prices as well as the unit labor costs, although the increase is
insigni¯cant in the second case. Note that the price reaction to the interest rate shock
con¯rms the so-called price puzzle frequently found in the literature and is consistent
with the interpretation that monetary policy induces non-negligible supply e®ects in the
short-run. That is, the cost-push e®ect being larger than the negative demand-side e®ect
of monetary policy shocks.
In contrast, lending standards transitorily decline in response to the policy shock.
Thus, the dynamics of lending standards appear to counteract the monetary tightening.
Put di®erently, although interest rates increase, banks loosen lending standards. To the
extent that lending standards proxy indirect costs associated with ¯nancial intermedi-
ation, our results suggest that these costs transitorily decline when monetary policy is
tightened.
This result is somewhat surprising, as one would expect an increase in lending stan-
dards, resulting in additional costs of working capital and therefore giving rise to ad-
ditional in°ationary pressure. However, it appears that bank lending standards do not
amplify but partially mute the cost e®ects of monetary policy, at least in the US.
Turning to the euro area, the impulse responses in Figure 3 were obtained by using
the posterior inference on the US to shape the prior distribution of the model parameters.
In the following, we present the results obtained using what we call the full US prior
information. This refers to a prior speci¯cation which uses the hyperparameters of the
posterior distribution of the VAR parameters and of the error covariance matrix to design
the prior distribution of the euro area system's model parameters. The resulting conjugate
priors are multivariate-normal and inverse Wishart for the VAR parameters and the error
covariance matrix, respectively. Using the US posterior as prior information in the euro
area system helps in capturing some dynamic features of the data and allows to obtain
relevant and signi¯cant results, although the euro area time series are quite short. This
will be shown in Section 7.
In Figure 3, we see that a contractionary monetary policy shock reduces the price level
and increases unit labor costs, although the responses are only marginally signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero. Note that we do not ¯nd a price puzzle with euro area data. The
response of standards is also negative, as in the US, but insigni¯cant. Thus, although
11the role of lending standards is not as pronounced as in the US, we ¯nd essentially no
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that banks amplify the impact of monetary shocks by
adjusting lending standards. This contrasts a bit the results of Maddaloni and Peydrµ o
(2009), who ¯nd a positive e®ect of the lagged overnight interest rate level on lending
standards. Their results rely on the analysis of the unweighed panel of euro area country-
speci¯c responses to the Bank Lending Survey, which are not publicly available. As longer
time series become available, it will be possible to re-assess our aggregate VAR results.
Note, however, that shocks to the lending standards have a positive e®ect on prices which
is marginally signi¯cant. Thus, although at the aggregate level bank lending standards
in the euro area do not appear to in°uence the cost channel transmission of monetary
policy, shocks to the lending standards exert some in°uence on prices. We conclude that
variations in euro area bank lending standards therefore represent a source of in°ation
dynamics, which contrasts with our results for the US.
Interestingly, the forecast error variance decompositions in Tables 2 and 3 show that
the interest rate and standards account for roughly the same fraction of the variance
in prices. For the US, after ¯ve years the shares increase to 7% and 9%, respectively.
Moreover, the interest rate and standards each account for much larger fractions, around
four times larger, than unit labor costs. Thus, we ¯nd that cost channel e®ects are more
relevant than wage costs in the US. According to Table 3, a similar conclusion emerges for
the euro area. At a ¯ve-year horizon, interest rate and standards shocks account even for
a larger fraction, respectively 10% and 14%, in HICP forecast error variance. The share
of unit labor costs increases to 7%.
6 The relevance of lending standards
To get a better picture of how lending standards impact on in°ation dynamics, we esti-
mate the systems without standards. Figures 4 and 5 show the responses when we drop
standards from the system. We see that in the US as well as in the euro area, the in°ation
rate now responds substantially stronger to the increase in the interest rate, suggesting
the presence of a cost channel in both regions, being twice as large in the US than in the
euro area. For the US, the e®ect on the in°ation rate is about twice as large as before. For
the euro area, the response is now positive, signi¯cantly so. Thus, we ¯nd that dropping
12the lending standards from the system, the direct e®ect of the interest rate on price setting
becomes larger. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the interest rate picks
up some of the e®ect of non-interest rate cost e®ects, if those are not explicitly taken into
account. Thus, the strong, direct cost channel e®ect documented in Chowdhury et al.
(2006) and Ravenna and Walsh (2006) may at least partially be attributed to neglected
e®ects of indirect, non-interest rate costs of working capital.
Although the change in impulse responses is considerable, the variance decomposition
for the US in Table 4 does not document an increased share of interest rate shocks in the
CPI forecast error variance. At the ¯ve-year horizon the share increases to 6%, compared
to 7% when standards are included. Overall, for all variables the variance share accounted
for by standards in the larger system is absorbed, at all horizons, in a higher share of
in°ation shocks in the reduced system.
For the euro area we observe the same consequences. Excluding standards in°ates the
variance share of in°ation shocks in the HICP and unit labor forecast error variances.
The error variance of the interest rate is mainly accounted for by own shocks in this
speci¯cation.
7 US posterior as prior information
In this section we evaluate the in°uence of using the hyperparameters of the posterior
distributions inferred for the US system to design the prior distributions of the euro area
system's VAR-parameters and error covariance matrix. We obtained the results presented
so far by using what we call the full US prior information, the setting in which the prior
distributions of both the VAR-parameters and the error covariance matrix are designed
with hyperparameters originating from the US system's posterior. We also show that in
general, the US prior information designing the VAR-parameters in°uences the location
of the posteriors, while the additional information on the error covariance matrix helps in
increasing the estimation precision. The prior design using only US information on the
VAR-parameters is called partial US prior. The results are evaluated against the posterior
obtained with a standard Minnesota prior design for the VAR-parameters, with a prior
mean of 0 and a prior variance of 0.09 and a shrink factor of 1. An inverse Wishart distri-
bution designs the error covariance matrix with scale S0 = ºI4, º = 0:175, and degrees of
13freedom s0 = 6, to obtain an expectation of E(S) = S0=(s0 ¡ (N + 1)=2) = 0:05I4 (with
N = 4 the number of variables), and a mode mode(S) = S0=(s0 + (N + 1)=2) = 0:02.
This prior also designs the US system.
7.1 In°uence on posterior distributions
Figure 6 depicts the posterior distributions of the ¯rst lag of the VAR-parameters obtained
under the di®erent prior designs. We observe that the distributions are mainly a®ected by
adding information of the US posterior distribution on the VAR-parameters (the partial
US prior). Adding additionally posterior information on the error covariance matrix (full
US prior) does not signi¯cantly a®ect the posterior. This justi¯es why we previously
reported the results for the euro area system obtained under the full US prior design.
The P-values reported in the ¯gure show that the ¯rst own autoregressive lag on stan-
dards and on the interest rate are signi¯cantly a®ected by including US prior information.
The probability of an estimated value larger than the posterior mean obtained under the
Minnesota prior design is 97% for standards and even 100% for the interest rate. Thus,
including US prior information introduces some persistence is these equations. The pos-
terior distribution of the interest rate coe±cient on prices is shifted signi¯cantly to the
left, the P-value is 0.03. This is interesting, given that for the US system we obtain a
positive reaction of prices to interest rates.
The location of the other posterior distributions is not signi¯cantly in°uenced by using
US prior information. However, generally, US prior information a®ects the precision of
the estimation. This is re°ected in Figure 7, which displays the posterior distributions
of the error covariance matrix. The distributions of the error variances of the unit labor
cost and of the interest rate equations are shifted to the right. The P-values, reporting
the probability of an estimated value larger than the posterior mode obtained under
the Minnesota-inverse Wishart prior, are 1.0 and 0.92, respectively. The distribution
for the error variance of the standards equation is shifted to the left. In general, the
covariance structure is not signi¯cantly a®ected by including US prior information. Again,
these results justify the reporting of euro area results obtained with the full US prior
speci¯cation.
147.2 In°uence on impulse responses
The e®ects of including US prior information on impulse responses are evaluated by
comparing the posterior distribution of responses at the 4-, 8- and 16-period horizon, which
corresponds to the one-, two- and four-year horizon, respectively. The impulse response
distributions of standards and unit labor costs do not signi¯cantly change when including
US prior information. Therefore, we only depict the impulse responses of prices and the
interest rate in Figures 8 and 9, respectively. In Figure 8, second line, we see that including
US prior information shifts the reaction of prices to a shock in the interest rate to the left.
Using the full US info design accentuates the tendency obtained under the partial US prior
design. The P-values, reporting the probability of a larger posterior response estimated
under the full US prior than the posterior mean of the distribution estimated under
the Minnesota prior, indicate that the shift, relative to the mean, would be marginally
signi¯cant at the 10% signi¯cance level. The reaction of prices to a standards shock is
shifted to the right, not as signi¯cantly as for the responses to the interest rate shock,
however.
The responses of the short-term interest rate to a standards shock (see Figure 9, ¯rst
line) is shifted to the left. Nevertheless, the precision in the estimates remains quite low
and overall, the response is insigni¯cant.
7.3 Posterior predictive test
Finally, we apply a posterior predictive test not only as a model diagnostic tool. It also
serves as an additional means of assessing whether the use of US prior information helps
in capturing data features. As test features, we choose the correlation structure between
the data, contemporaneous and lag/lead correlations.
To perform the test, we simulate N=1000 data replications out of the predictive pos-
terior distribution. The sample length is set to the observed sample T=67 for the US. For
the euro area, we simulate data of observed sample length, T=19, and of a relatively large
sample, T=100. Generally, the tendency of the test based on the observed data sample
length is accentuated when the test is based on the larger data sample length. Therefore,
we present test results obtained with data of sample length T=100 for the euro area.4
4The results based on simulated data of observed data sample length are available upon request.
15To quantify the signi¯cance, we again report P-values, which summarize the probability
of a larger correlation in simulated data than in observed data. For the euro area, we
provide three P-values, which correspond to simulated data from the predictive posterior
obtained under the di®erent prior designs.
For the US, the test serves as a means of model diagnostic. Figure 10 displays, against
observed data correlation, the distribution of the correlations between simulated price
data and simulated (leads and lags of) standards, the interest rate and unit labor costs.
The P-value of the simulated correlation between prices and unit labor costs lagged by two
periods (0.08) indicate marginal signi¯cant departure from data features. We also obtain
a signi¯cant P-value (which is not displayed to save space) for the correlation between
standards and unit labor costs lagged by four periods (0.04). Nevertheless, given that all
other simulated correlations well capture data features, we conclude that the model for US
time series is adequately speci¯ed. This also justi¯es using the US posterior distribution
to design the prior distribution of the euro area system.
Figure 11 displays the posterior predictive tests for the correlations with respect to
euro area HICP in°ation. The correlations between simulated lead values of standards and
prices are not well captured by the system, irrespective of the prior distribution design.
Nevertheless, in these cases the P-values only indicate marginal signi¯cant departure from
data features. On the contrary, in the second column we see that the correlations between
the simulated interest rate and simulated in°ation do not well reproduce data correlations,
which are anyway weak in the short observation sample. In our view, this clearly indicates
the need for longer time series to obtain corroborating posterior evidence of the results
we presented so far.
The P-values in the ¯nal column of Figure 11, summarizing the test for the correlation
between unit labor costs and prices, yield evidence that including in particular US prior
information on the error covariance matrix cancels out observed data correlation, at least
up to a lead/lag of unit labor cost of two periods. This gives additional evidence, that both
regions may show di®erent dynamic adjustments to shocks, depending on their ¯nancial
market design. This also will have to be assessed when longer time series will be available.
The P-values in Figure 12, ¯rst column, show that US information helps in capturing
data correlation between the interest rate and standards, except for the correlation with
16standards leading by four periods. The test results for the correlations between the interest
rate and unit labor costs (second column) are independent of the prior design. Basically,
data features are well captured, if we disregard the signi¯cant departure from observed
data correlation of the simulated correlation with unit labor costs leading by four periods.
In the last column of Figure 12, the results for the correlation between unit labor costs
and standards are mixed. The contemporaneous and the correlation with leading stan-
dards deteriorate when US information is included. On the other hand, the correlation
between lagging standards and unit labor costs are better captured with US prior infor-
mation. To summarize, US prior helps capturing data correlations between the interest
rate and lagging standards, and partly between the interest rate and unit labor costs.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the extent to which bank-lending standards as a proxy for
non-interest costs of ¯nancing working capital give rise to supply side e®ects of monetary
policy and how bank lending standards in°uence in°ation dynamics more generally.
We ¯nd that in the US, the cost channel is attenuated by lending standards. Put di®er-
ently, in response to rising interest rates, banks transitorily lower their lending standards
and thereby reduce the cost of working capital.
Since the series available for the euro area are too short for a meaningful analysis,
we impose US prior information when estimating the model for the euro area. With US
prior information lending standards apparently do not transmit monetary policy shocks,
but appear to be a signi¯cant source of shocks themselves. That is, shocks to the lending
standards result in °uctuations in prices.
Although the model appears to be well speci¯ed for the US, there is room for im-
provement for the euro area speci¯cation. We expect that longer data series will improve
the model speci¯cation. In particular, the ¯t in the correlation between in°ation and the
interest rate and unit labor costs is expected to improve.
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19A Tables
Table 1: Data sources
Euro Areaa) United Statesb)
Sample 2003:1-2007:4 1990:2-2007:3
Series
stand Bank Lending Survey, question 1, net
tightening of loans to large enterprises
Senior Loan O±cer Opinion Survey
on Bank Lending Practices, panel 1,
net percentage of domestic respondents
tightening standards for C& I loans to
large and medium enterprises
rate 1-month EURIBOR Federal Funds Rate
ulc Euro Area 12, total unit labor cost Bureau of Labor Statistics, unit labor
costs non-¯nancial enterprises
prices HICP-overall monthly index, season-
ally adjusted
IFS: CPI
a) All data from the ECB's statistical website, HICP: quarterly data obtained from
monthly averages
b) If not otherwise stated, data from the Federal Reserve Board's website
20Table 2: US: Forecast error variance decomposition
CPI in°ation, attributable to
horizon ¼ s R ·
0 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.91 0.02 0.05 0.02
8 0.87 0.02 0.06 0.04
12 0.85 0.02 0.07 0.06
20 0.82 0.02 0.07 0.09
ULC, attributable to
horizon ¼ s R ·
0 0.02 0.98 0.00 0.00
4 0.03 0.93 0.02 0.02
8 0.03 0.90 0.03 0.04
12 0.03 0.87 0.04 0.06
20 0.03 0.84 0.04 0.09
Interest rate, attributable to
horizon ¼ s R ·
0 0.02 0.02 0.97 0.00
4 0.02 0.04 0.77 0.17
8 0.03 0.06 0.57 0.34
12 0.03 0.07 0.47 0.44
20 0.03 0.07 0.39 0.51
Standards, attributable to
horizon ¼ s R ·
0 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.86
4 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.87
8 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.86
12 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.86
20 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.86
21Table 3: Euro area: Forecast error variance decomposition, full US prior
HICP, attributable to
horizon ¼ s R ·
0 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.85 0.04 0.05 0.06
8 0.77 0.06 0.07 0.10
12 0.73 0.06 0.08 0.12
20 0.69 0.07 0.10 0.14
ULC, attributable to
horizon ¼ s R ·
0 0.10 0.90 0.00 0.00
4 0.13 0.76 0.06 0.04
8 0.13 0.69 0.11 0.07
12 0.13 0.65 0.13 0.09
20 0.12 0.61 0.15 0.11
Interest rate, attributable to
horizon ¼ s R ·
0 0.05 0.04 0.92 0.00
4 0.08 0.05 0.82 0.04
8 0.10 0.06 0.75 0.08
12 0.11 0.07 0.71 0.10
20 0.12 0.07 0.68 0.13
Standards, attributable to
horizon ¼ s R ·
0 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.71
4 0.17 0.14 0.05 0.64
8 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.62
12 0.18 0.14 0.07 0.61
20 0.18 0.14 0.08 0.60
22Table 4: US: Forecast error variance decomposition, without standards
CPI in°ation, attributable to
horizon ¼ s R
0 1.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.94 0.02 0.04
8 0.92 0.02 0.05
12 0.92 0.02 0.06
20 0.92 0.03 0.06
ULC, attributable to
horizon ¼ s R
0 0.01 0.99 0.00
4 0.15 0.83 0.03
8 0.22 0.74 0.04
12 0.25 0.70 0.05
20 0.28 0.67 0.05
Interest rate, attributable to
horizon ¼ s R
0 0.08 0.02 0.90
4 0.11 0.03 0.86
8 0.14 0.03 0.83
12 0.15 0.03 0.82
20 0.16 0.03 0.81
23Table 5: Euro area: Forecast error variance decomposition, full US prior, without stan-
dards
HICP in°ation, attributable to
horizon ¼ s R
0 1.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.96 0.01 0.03
8 0.95 0.01 0.04
12 0.95 0.01 0.04
20 0.95 0.01 0.04
ULC, attributable to
horizon ¼ s R
0 0.08 0.92 0.00
4 0.24 0.74 0.02
8 0.33 0.64 0.03
12 0.37 0.60 0.03
20 0.40 0.57 0.03
Interest rate, attributable to
horizon ¼ s R
0 0.03 0.04 0.93
4 0.06 0.08 0.86
8 0.08 0.08 0.84
12 0.09 0.09 0.83
20 0.09 0.09 0.82
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27Figure 6: Euro area: Posterior of parameters on the ¯rst autoregressive lag, using
US posterior as prior. P-value: Probability of a posterior value estimated with full
US prior (-.-) exceeding the posterior mean estimated with the Minnesota prior (- -),




















































































































(- -) Minnesota prior, (-) Partial US prior, (-.-) Full US prior
Figure 7: Euro area: Posterior of error covariance matrix, using US posterior as prior.
P-value: Probability of a posterior value estimated with full US prior (-.-) exceeding the












































































28Figure 8: Euro area: Impulse response distribution of prices at various horizons. P-value:
Probability of a posterior response estimated with full US prior (-.-) exceeding the poste-
















































































(- -) Minnesota prior, (-) Partial US prior, (-.-) Full US prior
Figure 9: Euro area: Impulse response distribution of the short-term interest rate at
various horizons. P-value: Probability of a posterior response estimated with full US
prior (-.-) exceeding the posterior mean response estimated with the Minnesota prior (-


































































(- -) Minnesota prior, (-) Partial US prior, (-.-) Full US prior
29Figure 10: US: Correlation with CPI in°ation. P-value: Probability that a simulated
correlation exceeds the data correlation, P (corr > corrdata).




























































































































30Figure 11: Euro area: Correlation with HICP in°ation, T = 100. P-value: Probability























































































































































(- -) Minnesota prior (1st), (-) Partial US prior (2nd), (-.-) Full US prior (3rd)
31Figure 12: Euro area: Correlation with the 1-month EURIBOR and unit labor costs,
T = 100. P-value: Probability that a simulated correlation exceeds the data correlation,


















































































































































































(- -) Minnesota prior (1st), (-) Partial US prior (2nd), (-.-) Full US prior (3rd)
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